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INTRODUCTION.

Military retirement pay is not subject to division or equitable
distribution under community property or other variations of marital property laws.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mc* B.A., University of Texas, 1939; J.D., Southern Methodist University 1952; Past
Chairman of the Family Law Section, American Bar Association, and Texas State Bar
Section.
B.A., University of Texas, 1971; J.D., University of Texas, 1974; Council Member at
Large of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association.
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Carty v. McCarty' upset the structure of property division where
military pensions are involved for almost all states. Insofar as
Texas has no provisions for alimony,' or garnishment of wages,3
the McCarty decision could lead to Texas becoming a dumping
ground for the ex-wives of our nation's military. Certainly, the migration to Texas by military personnel seeking to shed their
spouses and enjoy Texas' less onerous divorce laws in light of McCarty has begun. This article will analyze the McCarty decision,
note its sweeping effects not only in relation to divorce laws but
also to the Employment Retirement Income and Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), and suggest remedies for its harsh effects.
II. McCarty v. McCarty
A.

Facts of the McCarty Case

Richard John McCarty, Colonel, United States Army, in 1976
filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Patricia Ann McCarty in California. He was then on active duty, had served 18
years, and sought, in his petition, to have his military retirement
set aside to him as his separate property. He retired after 20 years
of service. The trial court held that the military retirement was
quasi-community property, and divided it by a formula giving Mrs.
4
McCarty approximately 45% of each payment.
Retired Colonel McCarty appealed. His claim that the
supremacy clause precluded a state court from dividing or interfering with his military retirement benefits, was rejected by the California Court of Appeals.
1. -U.S.-., 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981).
2. See Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967) (Texas only state not allowing
alimony after judgment of divorce).
3. See TEx. CONAT. art. XVI, § 28; Tcx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (Vernon 1966).
4. See McCarty v. McCarty, -. U.S.....
-,
101 S. Ct. 2728, 2734, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589, 597
(1981); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800(a) (Deering Supp. 1981). This forumula is quite similar to

what is known in Texas as the Cearley-Taggart formula which gives the non-employed
spouse a certain percentage of military retirement "if, as, and when the benefits are received
by the employee spouse." Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976) (contingent

interest in military pension deemed community asset); see Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d
422, 424 (Tex. 1977) (fractional interest for division of military pension equals months of
marriage over months in military).
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B. The Majority Decision
The United States Supreme Court reversed 5 The majority
speaking through Justice Blackmun, held that there was "a conflict
between the terms of the federal military retirement statutes and
the community property rights" asserted by Mrs. McCarty.6 Furthermore, military retirement is a personal entitlement and a
spouse has no entitlement to it, not even under a limited quasicommunity property statute.7 Moreover, the application of community property principles to military pay threatens grave harm to
"clear and substantial" federal interests.'
1. Rationale
The majority supports its decision by finding a Congressional intent behind the military retirement system to insure a "youthful
and vigorous army". Moreover, military retirement pay represents
"reduced compensation for reduced current services" inasmuch as
the retired officers remain subject to recall to active duty at any
time.10
To determine whether the federal pre-emption doctrine was applicable, the Court purportedly utilized the test as enuciated in
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo," that is, inasmuch as "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife . . . belongs to
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States...
[s]tate family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to
'clear and subtantial' federal interests before the supremacy clause
will demand that state law be overridden."" Furthermore, as the
5. See McCarty v. McCarty, -. U.S.....-,
101 S. Ct. 2728, 2741, 2743, 69 L. Ed. 2d
589, 608 (1981).
6. Id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 2741, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 605.
7. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2738, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 606.
8. See id.at -.- 101 S. Ct. at 2741, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 606; cf. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. 581, 581 (1979) (Railroad Retirement Act benefits not divisible under community
property law); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (federal interest not suffi-

cient to overrule state law of coverture).
9. See McCarty v. McCarty,

-. U.S.....
-,

101 S. Ct. 2728, 2742, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589,

606-07 (1981).
10. See id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2736, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 599; United States v. Tyler, 105
U.S. 244, 245 (1881); 10 U.S.C. § 688(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
11. 439 U*S. 572 (1979).
12. Id. at 581; see McCarty v. McCarty, -.U.S.... -, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 2735, 69 L. Ed.
2d 589, 598 (1981).
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Hisquierdo Court noted, if the federal pre-emption doctrine is to
be applied, Congress must, by explicit statutory language, direct
that the state law be pre-empted.'8 Justice Blackmun, finding no
explicit statutory language directing federal pre-emption, found
explicit expression in legislative history that "the rights in retirement pay accrue to the retiree .

,1 Therefore, the McCarty
"...

Court found not just "a conflict" between the terms of the state
and federal law but found that application of community principles to military retired pay threatens grave harm to "clear and
substantial" federal interests. 15 Justice Blackmun, however, noted
that the threat of grave harm to "clear and substantial" federal
interests was only a potentiality.' 6 The Court recognized "that the
plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service member is often a serious one" which could possibly be ameliorated through social security benefits and garnishing the military retirement for support,
7
presumably after the military person receives the monthly check.1
In conclusion, McCarty noted the great deference the Court has
accorded Congress in respect to the control of military affairs explicitly stating that it was within the sphere of Congress to provide
a former spouse of a retired service member more protection. 8
B. The Dissent
Justice Rehnquist-having been educated and having practiced
law in a community property state, filed a scholarly, if not bitter
dissent.'9 Joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, he states that
the "majority's opinion convinces me it is both unprecedented and
wrong."'20
Justice Rehnquist points out that the majority has not quoted or
applied the Hisquierdo test for pre-emption, stating that: "the
13. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
14. See McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.-, -,
101 S. Ct. 2728, 2738, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589,
602 (1981) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 481, at 9 (1971)); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
584 (1979) (Congress intended railroad retired pay "actually reach the beneficiary").
15. See McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S... -,
101 S.Ct. 2728, 2741, 69 L. Ed. 2d 605-06
(1979).
16. See id. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2741, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 606.
17. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2742-43, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 608.
18. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2743, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 608.
19. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2743, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 608 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
20. See id. at
,101 S. Ct. at 2746, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 613 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Court cannot, even to its satisfaction, plausibly maintain that Congress has 'positively required by direct enactments that California's community property law be preempted by the provisions governing military retired pay.' " Justice Rehnquist further notes
that the majority's opinion of Congressional intent and history
misses the point of the case, that is, "community property rights,
which are quite distinct from rights to alimony or child support." 2
Justice Rehnquist then compares the only previous Supreme
Court cases concerning federal pre-emption of community property
law, McCune v. Essig,2s Wissner v. Wissner," Free v. Bland,as
7 and concludes "that
Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,' and Hisquierdo,2
there is no precedent supporting admission of the [McCarty] case
to the exclusive club."" At most, Justice Rehnquist concludes, the
majority should have struck down California's community property
law only to the extent of its conflict with federal law."
21. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2746, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 608 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2743, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 609 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
23. Compare id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 2744, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 609 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Congress has not enacted a schedule governing rights of ex-spouses to military retired
pay") with McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382, 389 (1905) (United States statute relating to
perfecting of homestead claim specifically provided for succession of interests and in conflict
with Washington community property law as relates to intestate succession).
24. Compare McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S .... , 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2744-45, 69 L. Ed.
2d 589, 610-11 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("forceful and unambiguous language of
[Wissneri] . . . has no parallel so far as military retired pay is concerned") with Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 658-59 (1950) (Congress specifically provided that servicemen had
the right to designate any beneficiary and to subsequently change named beneficiary).
25. Compare McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.-, -, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2745, 69 L. Ed. 2d
589, 611 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (language evidencing Congressional intent for
federal pre-emption not found in military retired pay section) with Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663, 666-68 (1962) (community property law prohibiting married couple from benefits of
survivorship provisions of treasury regulation conflicted with and was pre-empted by federal
regulation).
26. Compare McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S .... , 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2745, 69 L. Ed. 2d
589, 611 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (military retired pay section lacks specific language for federal pre-emption) with Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 307 (1964) (preemption of state community property law when federal treasury regulation clearly
conflicted).
27. Compare McCarty v. McCarty, -.U.S..-, -, 101 S. Ct. 2728. 2745, 69 L. Ed. 2d
587, 611 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (McCarty "is not Hisquierdo revisited") with
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (Congress by clear and specific language in
Railroad Retirement Act intended benefits go to retired worker alone and not spouse).
28. McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S .... , 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2744, 69 L. Ed. 2d 587, 609
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2744, n.1, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589, 610 n.1 (Rehnquist, J.,
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PRACTICAL EFFECTS

The dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist is better reasoned
and finds more support in case law. There are, however, practical
effects of the majority's decision not discussed by Justice Rehnquist, which further militate against the decision adopted by the
majority in McCarty. First, McCarty will give an unexpected windfall to all military personnel, both active and retired. In Texas,
where there are a significant number of military retirees, there is
no doubt that this number will increase inasmuch as Texas law
does not provide for court ordered ex-spousal support, 0 or garnishment of wages,31 and allows a great amount of exempt property. 2 Moreover, since the McCarty court designates military retirement as current compensation, an ex-spouse in Texas has only
a "fair share" of community property at the time of divorce and in
California a "substantially equal division" of community property,
sans military pay.33
Since military families move often-by some statistics 13.7 times
in an average 20 year career"-the military family usually does not
purchase the family home and furniture that are a significant portion of most marital estates. This pattern of many moves often
precludes the non-military spouse from pursuing a career of her
own. Even if she does obtain a job, she seldom remains in one location long enough to acquire any retirement interests or significant
promotions. The military spouse is an integral part of military organization and traditionally moves the possessions, transfers the
children to their new school, unpacks in the new house, and does
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argues that McCarty does not present "the rare occasion
where state family law has come into conflict with the federal statute [thereby giving] this
Court. . .limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress
has 'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted." Id. at -, 101
S. Ct. at 2743, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 608 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)).
30. See Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex. 1967).
31. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (Vernon 1966).
32. See TEx. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 49, 50, 51 (as amended in 1973); TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 3833-3836 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1982).
33. See CAL.Civ. CODE § 4800(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 1981); Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
34. See Statistics Compiled by ACTION for Former Military Wives, reprinted in Action, The Supreme Court Cuts Lifeline To Thousands Of Women And Children (available
from AFMU, 2102 Teri Road, Austin. Texas 78744).
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all the necessary settling while the military man is off on his new
assignment. Denying the non-military spouse participation in the
retirement benefits can leave that ex-spouse with no resources

while the military spouse has a secured income for life.
A.

Texas Cases-Pre-McCarty
In Busby v. Busby, 5 the Texas Supreme Court held that mili-

tary retirement pay was a community asset divisible at divorce."
Moreover, in Cearley v. Cearley,87 the supreme court held that
military retired pay was divisible whether the retirement entitlement was "vested" or "unvested."" Subsequent to the Hisquierdo
decision, the Texas Supreme Court in Eichelberger v. Eichelberger," ruled that Railroad Retirement Act benefits were not di-

visible by a Texas decree. 40 A similar result for Veterans Administration disability payments was reached in Ex parte Johnson.1

Finally, in Ex parte Burson,4 the supreme court upheld a disabled
serviceman's election to receive disability pay rather than military
retired pay on the ground that the supremacy clause pre-empted
division of the disability pay.43 The Burson court upheld the election despite the fact that the trial court had ordered the serviceman to pay a portion of his retired pay to his ex-wife."
B. McCarty-The Aftermath
There have been predictable reactions from various special inter35. 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
36. See id. at 554.
37. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
38. See id. at 666.
39. 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979).
40. See id. at 401.
41. 591 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1980); see also Ex parte Pummill, 606 S.W.2d 707, 709
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ) (prospective VA benefits not divisible).
42. 615 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. 1980).
43. See id. at 196.
44. See id. at 196. Compare Ex parte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1980) (VA
benefits not divisible pursuant to community property law) and 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979) (nonassignability and exempt status of VA benefits) with Busby v. Busby,
457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970) (military retired pay divisible under Texas community
property law) and 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976) (no specific determination of whether military
retirement pay is a personal entitlement). But see McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.,
101
S. Ct. 2728, 2742, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589, 605 (1981).
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est groups regarding McCarty. Servicemen's organizations have reacted triumphantly,"5 ex-spousal organizations with disbelief and
regret,"e and disinterested groups with concern.4
The Court itself suggested the answer to the problem lay with
45. See Afterburner, 23 U.S.A. NEWS OF RETIRED PERSONNEL 4 (1981).
46. See Scannell, Military Divorcees: 'We Also Served', Wash. Post, Dec 4, 1980, at 8,
col. 3.
47. See Foster & Freed, McCarty v. McCarty: Farewell To Arms?, 1981 N.Y.L.J. 1;
Kornfeld, Military Pensions, 2 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION REP. 1 (1981). Also, the American
Bar Family Law Section passed a resolution at its annual meeting in August, 1981, stating
as follows:
WHEREAS the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in McCarty has changed the
traditional property rights of individuals who work for various branches of the Federal Government; and
WHEREAS the McCarty ruling has created a broad area of uncertainty for family'
planning for retirement, and has now created an atmosphere of potential injury and
drastic displacement to individuals who are least able to protect their interest; and
WHEREAS it has traditionally been the prerogative of the individual states to define
the property rights of their citizens and virtually all states have now adopted legislation creating rights in property as between spouses; and
WHEREAS Congress has shown the sophistication to make various specific exemptions form state property laws, an example being social security;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the ABA call upon Congress to enact
legislation making all Federal deferred compensations, pensions, retired pay and
other compensations, pensions, retired pay and other compensations of that nature
subject to state property law.
The Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas passed a similar resolution at its annual
meeting in 1981, and the Board of Directors of the State Bar of Texas directed the Chair of
the section to contact all members of the Texas delegation in Congress concerning the
resolution.
The resolution was condensed to the following form:
Be it resolved that the American Bar Association calls upon Congress to inact legislation making all deferred compensation derived from federal employment, such as,
pensions, retired pay and other income of that nature, subject to state property law,
except as specifically exempted by explicit federal legislation.
This resolution, number 112, was passed by the ABA House of Delegates on January 25,
1982 and has the full force and effect of being the official position of the American Bar
Association on the subject. This resolution was passed in direct response to the McCarty
decision.
In response to the Ridgway decision the Family Law Section of the ABA in January 1982,
passed a resolution which expands the previous McCarty resolution to include "any" employment and not just "federal" employment.
Congress currently has many bills under consideration with hearings held in various committees. See generally Statement of Stanford E. Lerch, Chairman, Section of Family Law,
Michael E. Barber, Council Member Section of Family Law, and Robert D. Arenstein,
Chairman on Interstate and Federal Support Laws and Procedures Section of Family Law,
on behalf of the American Bar Association, before the Subcommittee on Manpower and
Personnel Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate concerning S. 1814
(Feb. 10, 1982).
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Congress. 48 As of January 1, 1982, however, none of several bills

were reported out of subcommittees even after hearings.4' There
remains the hopeful possibility that legislation will be enacted
changing the statute under which the Court based its decision.
1. Offsetting Military Retired Pay to Reach Fair and Just Division of Property
Insofar as McCarty holds that military retired pay is not marital

property subject to division under state community property laws
the issue still remains whether retired pay can be considered in
allocating property to the other spouse under the "just and right"
provision of the Texas Family Code section 3.63.s Hisquierdo,
clearly disallows awards of property from the retired railroad em-

ployee to his spouse to offset the benefits received under the Railroad Retirement Act. 51 McCarty indicates that the same prohibition against offsetting property must also be followed regarding
military retired pay.se If military retired pay is not marital prop48. See S. 1814, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (state courts have power to distribute community or equitable interest in retirement pay); S. 1772, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (nonpre-emption of state law for military retired pay); S. 1648, 97th Cong., 1st Seass. (1981) (military spouse retirement equity act); S. 1453, 97th Cong., 1st Seass. (1981) (disposition of retired benefits between member and spouse). S. 888, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (bill to
assure equality of economic opportunities); S. 530, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (amendment
of Railroad Retirement Act to provide for divorced or surviving spouses if married for ten
years or more); H. 1926, 97th Cong., 1st Sese. (1981) (amend Railroad Retirement Act so as
not to pre-empt state property law); H. 1641, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend IRC
and ERISA to provide for greater protection for women in private pension plans); H. 1265,
97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (amendment of Railroad Retirement Act to eliminate the years
of service limitation credit for military service to war time service); H. 195, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) (provision for benefits to divorced person under Railroad Retirement Act); H.R.
3117, 97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981) (assure equality); H.R. 3039, 97th Cong., 1st Seass. (1981)
(provide ten year spouse portion of annuity); H.R. 1711, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (authorize court ordered payments).
49. See S. 1453, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (disposition of retired benefits between
member and spouse); S. 1648, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (military spouse retirement equity act); H.R. 1711, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (authorize court ordered payments); H.R.
3039, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (provide ten year spouse portion of annuity); H.R. 3117,
97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981) (assure equality).
50. See McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.....-,
101 S. Ct. 2728, 2742, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589,
607 (1981); Tmx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
51. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979); Eichelberger v.
Eichelburger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. 1979).
52. See McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S ....
101 S. Ct. 2728, 2742, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589,
607 (1981).
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erty in a divorce proceeding, it follows that it is not marital property during the marriage either. Inasmuch as military retired pay is
not marital property during the marriage, a significant problem
arises in tracing assets procured with military retired pay. As the
Texas Supreme Court noted in Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer," the
separate property of a spouse is not subject to divestment in a divorce proceeding if invested in real estate. 5' Texas, as a result of
the present laws, will certainly become a haven for military personnel or military retirees contemplating divorce.
IV. THE QUESTION OF RETROACTIVITY
Although the majority seems to limit its ruling in McCarty only
to the military retirement issue before the Court, the question of
the effect of McCarty on any divorce judgment involving anything
to do with the military or anything to do with retirement remains
open.
A. Enforcement of Pre-McCarty Orders by Contempt
The retroactivity question is, of course, totally intertwined with
enforcement of existing final decrees. Texas, in the eyes of some
commentators, has extremely weak and ineffective enforcement
procedures." The Texas Supreme Court, however, has upheld enforcement by contempt of a clear and specific award of retirement
payments in Ex parte Gorena. 6
In light of McCarty several military retirees have quit paying
military retired pay (which had been divided by a court decree
prior to McCarty) to their ex-spouses. In Ex parte Rodriguez57 the
serviceman was found in contempt by the district court for failure
to pay a portion of military retired pay to his ex-spouse." His application for habeas corpus to the Fourth Court of Appeals was
denied on the grounds that McCarty was not to be given retroactive effect. 9 The Rodriguez panel adopted the dissenting opinion
53. 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
54. See id. at 142. A receiver to collect and disburse rents and income received from the
real property can, however, be appointed to support a spouse's child. See id. at 152.
55. See Foster & Freed, McCarty v. McCarty: Farewell To Arms?, 1981 N.Y.L.J. 1, 4
n.17 (Texas's only state that refuses to award alimony, restricts enforcement).
56. 595 S.W.2d 841, 846-47 (1979).
57. No. 04-81-00333-CV, slip op. (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981).
58. See id. at 1.
59. See id. at 6. But see Ex parte Buckhanan, No. 4-81-00243-CV, slip op. (Tex. Ct.
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of Associate Justice Klingeman in the case of Ex parte Buckanan.60 Justice Klingeman, relying upon the retroactivity test of
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,6' determined that substantial inequitable results would follow if McCarty was given retroactive effect. 62
Furthermore, the Rodriguez court found nothing in McCarty
which would suggest that the Supreme Court "intended to invalidate, or otherwise render unenforceable, prior valid and subsisting
state court judgments."" The Third Court of Appeals in Ex parte
Gaudion' also held that McCarty should not have retroactive
application."
Moreover, a California Appellate Court in In re Sheldon" declared that McCarty should only have retroactive application if the
military spouse requested that the trial court reserve jurisdiction
in the character of the interest in the pensions, or timely raised
and briefed the federal pre-emption issue on appeal. 7 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted in Chicot County Drainage
App. Oct. 15, 1981) (panel of Fourth Court of Appeals held McCarty rendered district
court's judgment void). The Fourth Court of Appeals recently sat en banc in the case of Ex
parte Hobermale to determine whether that court would hold McCarty retroactive.
60. See 4-81-00243-CV, slip op. at 9 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1981) (Klingeman; J.,
dissenting).
61. 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). The test for retroactivity is set forth as follows:
In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must
establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants may have relied,. . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed ..... Second, it has been stressed that 'we must
...weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the
rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.' Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for '[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding
the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity.'
Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
62. See Ex parte Rodriguez, No. 04-81-00333-CV, slip op. at 6 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 10,
1981) (quoting Ex parte Buckhanan, No. 4-81-00243-CV, slip op. at 12 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct.
15, 1981) (Klingeman, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 7; see Erspan v. Badgett, 659 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. No. 13, 642 T2-82-06-139, slip op. (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1982).
65. See id. at 4. The Eighth Court of Appeals in Ex parte Acree, No. 08-81-00256-CV
slip op. (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1981) followed Ex parte Buckanan to hold that McCarty
was to be given retroactive effect. Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court will have to rectify
the decisions of the various courts of appeals.
66. 177 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1981).
67. See id. at 385.
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Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,"8 "[t]he past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration.""
Unfortunately Ridgway v. Ridgway, 70 enunciates a powerful indication of total retroactivity. In Ridgway, husband and wife, after
long negotiations, agreed to a divorce. In the divorce decree the
husband-serviceman was ordered to, and also by agreement contracted to keep the children of the marriage as the beneficiaries of
his Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLIA). The husband remarried, and then effectively changed the beneficiary of his insurance to his new wife. Upon his death, the Maine Supreme Court
invoked a constructive trust in favor of the children on the proceeds from the policy. 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
husband-serviceman's designation of his new wife as beneficiary
prevails over the constructive trust upon the insurance proceeds as
agreed, and also as ordered by the state court.7" The Supreme
Court justified this pre-emption of state law by demonstrating that
the provisions of the Serviceman's Group Life Insurance Act of
1965 allowing the insured service member the right to alter or
change his beneficiary designation at any time by the proper procedure will prevail over and displace any inconsistent state law.73
The second reason given by the Supreme court in Ridgway is that
a constructive trust would be a forbidden seizure of the proceeds,
because the SGLIA has provisions exempting policy proceeds from
the claims of creditors and from attachment, levy or seizure "by
any legal process."74 By this reason, the Court sanctified its earlier
disinfranchising of spouses of military retirees in McCarty and extended this logical result by placing children of a spouse in the
same class as ordinary creditors of that spouse. Ridgway sparked a
vigorous dissent by Justice Powell, who called the majority's decision "uniquely unjust", and was joined by Justice Rehnquist, the
68. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
69. Id. at 374.
70. 50 U.S.L.W. 4006 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981).
71. See Ridgway v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 419 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Me. 1980).
72. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 50 U.S.L.W. 4006, 4011 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981).
73. See id. at 4008-10; 38 U.S.C. § 770 (1976).
74. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 50 U.S.L.W. 4006, 4010 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); 38 U.S.C.
770(g) (1976).
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author of the McCarty dissent.70 Justice Stevens also dissented,
expressing doubt that Congress intended to pre-empt the serviceman's support obligations to this family dependents, noting that
even "spendthrift trusts" can be reached for family support.7 ' He
found additional support for this argument in the 1975 Congressional Amendments which allow a serviceman's pay to be attached
for support or alimony."7
Combining Ridgway and McCarty, one can argue that no court
award of military retirement is enforceable either by contempt or
by contract, insofar as these decisions indicate that neither the
parties nor the court had the ability to agree or to order such an
award in the first place.
V.

THE NIGHTMARE OF

McCarty: ITS APPLICABILITY TO ERISA

Admittedly, a minority of divorced spouses are affected by the
Railroad Retirement Act, Veterans Administration disability, military retirement, or GI Insurance. In the aftermath of Hisquierdo,
McCarty, and Ridgway, the larger question is what other "benefits" are not subject to division in any divorce.
Before Hisquierdo,Texas cases had held that many non-tangible
items were divisible by the divorce court: vested retirement,78 unvested retirement,7 9 non-divided items in decree,80 non-government
benefits, 1 Federal Civil Service Retirement," state or local government pensions," and earned property rights." After Hisquierdo,
the Texas courts held that Hisquierdo determined the award of
"benefits" and ruled that railroad retirement,"5 military readjust75. See
dissenting).
76. See
77. See
78. See
79. See
80. See
81. See
82. See
dism'd).
83. See
dism'd).
84. See
dism'd).
85. See

Ridgway v. Ridgway, 50 U.S.L.W. 4006, 4011 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981) (Powell, J.,
id. at 4013, 4014 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
id. at 4013, 4014 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970).
Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1977).
Taggert v. Taggert, 552 S.W.2d 442, 423 (Tex. 1977).
Herring v. Blakely, 385 S.W.2d 843, 847-48 (Tex. 1965).
In re Batten, 543 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ
Collida v. Collida, 546 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ
Simmons v. Simmons, 568 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. 1979).
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ment allowance," and VA disability compensation payments"" are
not subject to division as property.
Now there is concern that all retirement benefits will be affected
under the majority reasoning in McCarty.
A.

ERISA

ERISA covers a wide range of private benefit plans for employees and their beneficiaries, and contains both pre-emption and
anti-alienation provisions." Virtually all private retirement plans
are regulated by ERISA. 89 Although the majority opinion in Hisquierdo distinguished ERISA regulated plans because they are created by private contract, McCarty and Ridgway suggest that the
issue may not be settled.'0 As Justice Rehnquist noted in McCarty
"I am not certain whether the analysis was wrong in Hisquierdoor
in this case, but it is clear that both cannot be correct. One is led
to inquire where this moving target will next appear.""1
The Hisquierdo test, as used in McCarty and Ridgway, requires
only a minimal "clear expression" of Congressional intent that
state property law should be pre-empted. It is clear under section
1144 of ERISA that Congress intended to preempt state law in regard to employee benefit plans.29
The extent of federal pre-emption in regard to ERISA benefits is
undetermined. As the Supreme Court noted in Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc.93 several "courts have reached varying conclusions as to the meaning of ERISA's pre-emptive language in other
contexts.

'94

Alessi held that a New Jersey statute which calculated

86. See Perez v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1979).
87. See Ex parte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1979).
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
89. See id. § 1003 (1975).
90. Compare Ridgway v. Ridgway, 50 U.S.L.W. 4006, 4009-10 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981)
(Congress allowed servicemen right to change beneficiary which could derogate rights of
101 S. Ct. 2728, 2747, 69
family under state law) and McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.....-,
L. Ed. 2d 589, 613 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (McCarty not logical extension of Hisquierdo) with Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 n.24 (1979) (Congress intended to
merely regulate ERISA).
101 S. Ct. 2728, 2747, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589, 613
91. McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.....-,
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
93. -U.S.-., 101 S. Ct. 1895, 69 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1981).
101 S. Ct. at 1907 n.21, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 418 n.21.
94. See id. at -,
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pension benefits without integrating other pension benefits was in
direct clash with ERISA's provisions for integrating workmen's
compensation awards."5 The Alessi Court specifically refused to
address the issue of pre-emption in regard to state court division of
ERISA benefits pursuant to applicable community property law."
Lower federal courts and state courts have generally held that such
divisions are not pre-empted by ERISA.97 In Stone v. Stone,"8 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that ERISA did not
pre-empt California's community property laws and upheld the
state court's division of ERISA benefits." Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court in Burson noted the holding of the Stone court and
decisions of other jurisdictions with approval.100
Burson, however, is a prime example of the dangers in relying
upon state and lower federal court decisions as to whether federal
statutorily created retirement and benefit plans pre-empt state
community property laws.'" ' The Texas Supreme Court in Burson,
after noting that the United States Supreme Court had recently
heard oral argument in the McCarty case, stated that military retirement pay was subject to state community property law.102 Similarly, the California Supreme Court, in Hisquierdo,held that benefits received under the Railroad Retirement Act were subject to
that state's community property laws; this decision too was reversed by the United States Supreme Court.108 Recently, in Ridgway the United States Supreme Court reversed the Maine Supreme Court to hold that under SGLIA a serviceman could change
his beneficiary in derogation of state community property law.'"
95. See id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1905-1907, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 415-418.
96. See id. at _, 101 S. Ct. at 1907 n.21, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 418 n.21.
97. See Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1980); Operating Engineers Local
No. 428 v. Zamborsky, 470 F. Supp. 1174, 1175-76 (D. Ariz. 1979); In re Marriage of Compa,
152 Cal. Rptr. 362, 365-68 (Cal. App. 1979); Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 195 n.5 (Tex.
1981). But see Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 85-87 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
98. 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980).
99. See id. at 741-42.
100. See Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 195 n.5 (Tex. 1981).
101. See id. at 193-194 n.2 (Texas court construes military retirement act not to preempt state court division under community property).
102. See id. at 193-94 n.2.
103. See In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593, 566 P.2d 224, 227 (Cal.
1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 572, 583-587 (1979).
104. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 50 U.S.L.W. 4006, 4011 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981).
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As Justice Rehnquist noted in McCarty, it is difficult to ascertain
where the "moving target" of federal pre-emption "will next appear." 10
' It would be safe to project that ERISA could be the next
"target" for federal preemption.
VI.

THE FUTURE

Although the United States Supreme Court since Hisquierdo has
denied certiorari on questions of pre-emption of state law and division of property, one contemplates the results of the next case that
the court decides in the family law area. While on the one hand,
the Chief Justice notes that the federal courts are over-burdened,
the Court's incursions into matters which have previously been exclusively state matrimonial law concerns will not lessen the federal
court's load. Congress has the power to change the statutes; the
lobbies-the more powerful one aligned with the military
spouse-will have their influence in the slow process of legislative
enactment and change.
The burden of McCarty and Ridgway is crushingly heavy in
Texas. The liberal exemption laws, lax enforcement procedures,
and the lack of any legal mechanism to correct the sudden and
dramatic effect of these decisions mandates urgent action by the
Texas Legislature for some sort of spousal support after divorce.
Some Texas jurists foresaw the trend at the time of the Hisquierdo
decision.'" The Texas Legislature could choose to join the other 49
states in allowing some kind of ex-spousal support. But until Congress or state legislatures enact changes or the United States
Supreme Court rules again, it is clear that chaos will reign in divorce courts over retirement questions.

105. See McCarty v. McCarty, -U.S.-., 101 S. Ct. 2728, 2747, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589, 613
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Justice Quentin Keith of the Beaumont Court of Appeals correctly predicted the
trend to follow Hisquierdoin his presentation to the Family Law Section of the State Bar of
Texas, June 27, 1979, in San Antonio, Texas. Justice Keith further implored the urgent
necessity for Texas to finally adopt a spousal support statute, i.e., limited alimony in an
Eichelburger situation. See Address by Justice Quentin Keith, State Bar of Texas, Family
Law Section (June 27, 1979).
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